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Abstract 
 
In 1997 former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volker posed a question about the 
commercial banking system he said he could not answer. The industry was under more 
intense competitive pressure than at any time in living memory, Volcker noted, “yet at 
the same time the industry never has been so profitable.” I refer to the seemingly strange 
coexistence of intense competition and historically high profit rates in commercial 
banking as Volcker’s Paradox. In this paper I extend the paradox to all important 
financial institutions and discuss four developments that together help resolve it. They 
are: rapid growth in the demand for financial products and services in the past quarter 
century; rising concentration in most major financial industries that makes what 
Schumpeter called “corespective” competition and the exercise of market power possible 
(thus raising the possibility that competition is not universally as intense as Volcker 
assumed); increased risk-taking among all the major financial market actors that has 
raised average profit rates; and rapid financial innovation in over-the-counter derivatives 
that allows giant banks to create and trade complex products with high profit margins. 
The last section of the paper discusses the role of moral hazard in today’s financial 
markets. Has the conventional belief that financial investment strategies formerly 
considered too risky to adopt have been made safe (and profitable) by modern risk-
management techniques increased the likelihood of a future systemic financial crisis?  
 
JEL Codes: E44, G2, G21, G24, L1 
 
 
Key Words: financial markets, financial profits, competition, financial strategies, 
systemic financial crises 
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Introduction 
 Progressive analysts have produced an impressive body of research on 
‘financialization’ - the effects of financial markets on nonfinancial corporations in 
particular and on national and global economic activity in general - in the past quarter 
century. By comparison, our collective understanding of why the financial sector has 
become so powerful and of what dynamic forces are driving present day financial 
processes is underdeveloped. We might say that we do not have an adequate 
understanding of the ‘other side’ of financialization. (Needless to say, a full explanation 
of the evolution of financial markets cannot be constructed unless the contemporaneous 
dynamics of the nonfinancial sector are taken into account – and conversely.)  
 
 There are many reasons why our understanding of financial markets is inadequate, 
not the least of which is that crucial information is not easily attainable. Publicly 
available data is more adequate for research work on nonfinancial than on financial firms 
and markets. For example, it is extremely difficult to calculate a meaningful profit rate 
for the financial sector as a whole.1 Most important data on financial firms and markets 
are proprietary. A researcher would have to have a substantial budget to access even a 
reasonable subset of it. The sheer size and complexity of financial institutions contributes 
to non-transparency. There are three US bank holding companies with assets in excess of 
one trillion dollars. As near as I can tell, not even the top executives of these 
extraordinarily complex enterprises have a detailed understanding of what goes on in all 
their subsidiaries. Moreover, many assets and liabilities are off-balance-sheet and thus 
hidden from the observer. Finally, it is almost impossible to make sense of the oceans of 
information that giant conglomerates do provide in their income and balance sheet 
statements. These may run to hundreds of pages with hundreds of complex footnotes. 
Only someone skilled in forensic accounting and with lots of free time could possibly 
make any sense of all this information. Thus, the fate of scholars who try to understand 
these firms and markets without adequate financial support and, typically, without a team 
of co-workers, is not an enviable one.  
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 Financial markets have undergone dramatic change between the first decades of 
the post WWII era and the past 25 years. One of the most important dimensions of this 
change is the substantial rise in financial firm profitability that has taken place since the 
early 1990s. Whether measured as the return on asset and equity for commercial banks as 
in Figure 1, as real profits of the financial sector as in Figure 2, as a percent of GDP as in 
Figure 3, or relative to those of nonfinancial corporations in Figure 4, financial sector 
profits over the past 14 years have been impressive.2 While the so-called Golden Age of 
modern capitalism is thought to have ended somewhere in the 1970s, since the early 
1990s we seem to be living in a new ‘Golden Age’ of finance. (Most of the data used in 
this paper is for US financial firms.) 
 
 In the financialization literature with which I am familiar, no one has adequately 
explained why financial sector profit rates rose in this period when real-sector profits 
were disappointing. The answer to this question is not obvious, especially because the era 
is universally believed to be one of fierce competition in financial markets. This 
‘cutthroat’ competition is understood to have three roots. First, the regulatory structure 
put in place in the US in the 1930s, which purposely segmented financial markets to 
minimize what was seen as destructive competition, collapsed over a two decade process 
of deregulation culminating in the repudiation of Glass-Steagall in 1999. Many other 
countries have also moved away from tight financial market regulation. Second, 
government restrictions on access to their national markets by foreign financial firms 
have been largely removed. Third, technical change revolutionized financial markets. The 
combination of almost unlimited computational speed and cheap telecommunication 
capacity allowed financial markets to be global, opaque and hard (though not impossible) 
to regulate, and made possible the phenomenal growth and complexity of the derivate 
markets that dominate financial services. They thus made it technically possible for every 
financial firm to compete with every other firm no matter where they were located. 
 
 We thus confront a paradox: the coexistence of historically high profit rates in 
most financial industries with what appears to be intense competition. It is normally 
assumed that the two are incompatible over long periods. While progressives seem not to 
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have noticed this paradox, important mainstream analysts have been puzzled by it. In 
1997 the FDIC held a conference on problems in US banking in the dangerous 1980s, an 
era with low and volatile profit rates that threatened the viability of major money center 
banks. Speaking at the close of the last session, Paul Volcker posed a question to the 
distinguished audience, one he said he did not know how to answer:  
 
 “We have reached the magic hour. I had another comment I was going to make. 
You won’t be able to resolve it for me but I’ll raise it anyway. It strikes me that 
when one looks at the banking system, never before in our lifetime has the 
industry been under so much competitive pressure with declining market share in 
many areas and a feeling of intense strain, yet at the same time, the industry never 
has been so profitable with so much apparent strength. How do I reconcile those 
two observations?” (FDIC 1997, p. 118).  
 
 George Hanks, writing in the FDIC Banking Review seven years later, commented 
on the same phenomenon. “Operating in a generally favorable environment, banks have 
responded to intensified competition and the expanded opportunities offered by sweeping 
legislative and regulatory changes. With some exceptions, they have performed at levels 
of profitability that would have been regarded as extraordinary in earlier years” (2004, p. 
16) I refer to this odd combination of apparent intense competition and high profits in 
finance as Volcker’s Paradox. 
 
 I discuss four over-lapping reasons why high profits and lowered barriers to 
competition have been able to coexist in this period. First, the demand for financial 
products and services has grown exponentially. Competition is least corrosive of 
profitability in periods of strong demand. Second, there has been a rapid rise in 
concentration in most wholesale and global financial markets as well as in several 
important domestic retail markets. Three to seven firm concentration ratios are now quite 
high. This has created an important precondition for what Schumpeter called 
“corespective” competition – an industry regime in which large firms compete in many 
ways, but avoid the kinds of competitive actions such as price wars that significantly 
undercut industry profit. Third, there is substantial evidence that large financial 
institutions have raised their profit rates by taking on greater risk, risk that is partially 
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hidden from view because much of it is located off-balance-sheet. To adequately assess 
this proposition requires an analysis of firm, industry and systemic risk. (A complete 
treatment of rising financial sector profit and risk should include an assessment of the 
increasing importance of hedge and private equity funds. I do not evaluate these 
institutions in any detail in this paper.) Fourth, giant commercial and investment banks 
have turned innovation into a core business. They create and trade ever more complex 
derivative products in ever higher volume. They have been able to achieve high margins 
on much of this business by selling the bulk of their products over-the-counter (OTC) 
rather than on exchanges, thus insulating the profit margin from destructive competition. 
It should be noted that without frequent large-scale government bailouts of national 
financial systems, the Golden Age of finance could not have occurred.  After discussing 
some of the reasons to believe that systemic risk has risen, I draw tentative conclusions 
about likely future financial market developments. 
 
 The reader should be clear on what I am and am not trying to accomplish. I will 
try to explain the market forces that made it possible for many financial industries to 
sustain high profits in what is assumed to be a regime of intense competition. I make no 
attempt here to answer the more profound question: “where do these profits come from?” 
I do not ask whether modern financial markets create extra value and keep a large share 
of it, whether profits come from manias or “bubbles,” or if they are part of the immense 
redistribution of income and wealth that seems to be an inherent component of current 
neoliberal global capitalism. I thus leave Pollin’s important question to Arrighi 
unanswered. Pollin notes that “Arrighi never explicitly poses the most basic question 
about [Marx’s] M→M′ circuit, which is, where do the profits come from if not from the 
production and exchange of commodities?” (1996, p. 115). 
 
1. Financial Firms have operated in a high growth industry in their Golden Age 
 
 Figures 5 through 8 demonstrate that there has been an astounding rate of 
expansion of financial markets since 1980. For example, Figure 7 shows that credit 
market debt was 168% of GDP in 1981 and 330% in 2005. Figure 8 shows that financial 
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assets were about five times larger than GDP in 1980, but nine and one-half times bigger 
in 2005. Figure 9 shows that the notional value of all derivative contracts rose from about 
three times global GDP in the late 1990s to 8 times global GDP in 2005. Most of this data 
suggests that the rapid growth of financial market is coterminous with the onset of the 
neoliberal era around 1980 or so.  
 
 Two complementary general explanations of this growth come to mind. First, 
there were large exogenous increases in the flow of funds into financial institutions (via 
pension funds, capital account surpluses and so forth) and in the demand for credit (for 
example, to fund rising government budget deficits and Third World borrowing, to meet 
secularly rising mortgage demand, and, through a process known as ‘financial 
deepening,’ to fund the growth of financial firms themselves) and other financial services 
in this era. These secular flows help explain the rising leverage and recurrent asset price 
bubbles of the period. (This is a critical part of the explanation of the paradox that I do 
not discuss in detail here.) Second, after the early 1990s, most financial firms experienced 
high profits and responded by raising output and innovating new products and services, 
an endogenous explanation conditioned by the exogenous trends that made rising profits 
possible. An overview of the history of the period suggests that both factors were at 
work. Exogenous factors were dominant in the 1980s and early 1990s, while endogenous 
responses to high profit rates have added to industry growth since then.  
 
Thus, even though deregulation, technical change and globalization created 
conditions conducive to more intense competition for both non-financial firms and 
financial firms in the neoliberal era, the deleterious effects of these changes were muted 
in financial markets by the rapid rise in demand for financial products. This is in sharp 
contrast to the situation that faced nonfinancial firms in the same era. As I argued in 
Crotty 2005, sluggish aggregate demand growth after the 1970s raised industry excess 
capacity and exacerbated competitive intensity, which hit nonfinancial corporate profits 
hard. Financial profits, on the other hand, were sustained by rapidly rising demand. 
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 However, rapid growth in demand is not a sufficient condition for high profits. As 
Figures 2 and 3 make quite clear, the 1980s and early 1990s were not prosperous times 
for the financial sector. Figure 1 shows that commercial banking, the sub-sector with the 
lion’s share of the industry’s profits, was in crisis in much of the 1980s. High demand 
growth was accompanied by large negative “shocks” caused by deregulation and rising 
competition. Large commercial banks were also hit by inflation-induced 
disintermediation and the Latin American debt crisis. These caused low profit rates and 
created serious threats to the solvency of giant banks. These problems were only resolved 
through dramatic government interventions of various sorts, including large bailouts.3 
However, by the early 1990s enough stability had been restored for demand growth to 
enrich most of the key sectors even with the removal of restraints on competition. Thus 
began the new Golden Age. In my opinion, rapid demand growth alone cannot 
adequately explain the historically high profits of the era.  
 
2. The rise of market power sustained high profitability 
 
 There has been a substantial increase in the market share held by a small number 
of the largest firms in important financial markets in the last quarter century. 
Concentration ratios in these markets are now quite high. The system-shaking problems 
in commercial banking in the 1980s and early 1990s drove many firms out of the 
industry. From the end of WWII through 1979 there were only a few years in which the 
number of failures exceeded single digits.  But between 1984 and 2003, 2700 banks 
failed. Three quarters of these failures took place in the crisis period of 1987-1991. There 
were more than 15,000 banks at the end of the 1970s and fewer than 8,000 by 2002 
(Jones and Crutchfield 2005, p. 33). As can be seen in Figure 10, as late as 1990, the top 
3 commercial banks owned just 10.5% of industry assets. A frantic merger process raised 
that figure to 19% by 1997. Several mega-mergers raised top-3 ownership to 31% of 
industry assets by 2000. By 2003, the largest seven commercial banks in the US had 
nearly 50% of total industry assets. The concentration process was not limited to the US. 
The ratio of the assets of the world’s largest 20 banks to the GDP of the G13 was 20% in 
1980, 32% in 1990, and 40% in 1998 (Group of Ten, 55).  
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  The US Census Bureau publishes information on concentration every five years. 
Since the data is organized under a standard industry classification system that changes 
over time, it is not possible to track a consistent set of categories for all industries. 
Nevertheless, the data is instructive. Consider four firm revenue (not asset) concentration 
ratios for 1992 and 2002. In commercial banking it was 21% in 1992, and 30% a decade 
later. For savings institutions it was 12% in 1992, but rose to 31% by 2002. For 
investment banking and securities dealing, it was 32% in 1992 and 41% in 2002.  Several 
life insurance categories showed similarly high concentration. Concentration ratios in 
wholesale commercial banking and in important segments of investment banking are 
higher yet. For example, the combined net income earned in 2005 by the smallest ten of 
the top 15 investment banking firms was $1.9 billion. Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and 
Morgan Stanley each had more than $5 billion in net earning that year (S&P 2006: 
investment banking subsidiaries of bank holding companies were not included). Davis  
reports that the share of the global M&A market held by the top three US investment 
banks rose from 15% in 1992 to over 50% by 2000 (Davis 2003, p. 24). The top three 
commercial banks in the large corporate loan market control at least half the business.  
 
The Group of Ten did a massive survey of available data and research on the 
causes and consequences of rising consolidation in national and global financial markets 
and published their findings in a “Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector” in 
2001. The first sentence of the Report’s “Summary” is: “The ongoing consolidation of 
financial institutions is one of the most notable contemporary features of the financial 
landscape both within and across many industrial countries” (Group of Ten 2001, 
“Summary Report,” p. 1). The report presents substantial data to support this claim.  
 
 Such high concentration ratios are necessary conditions for the exercise of 
oligopolistic market power. They make it possible for dominant firms to adopt the 
partially competitive, partially cooperative behavior Schumpeter called “corespective” 
competition to create and sustain high industry profit rates. There is evidence that large 
firms in some key financial markets have used this market power to raise profit rates. 
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Thus, while certain conditions conducive to intense competition have characterized this 
era, just as Volcker asserted, they may not in fact have led to a regime of universally 
intense competition.  
 
 Extensive reading of the business press and conversations with financial market 
practitioners has led me to conclude that inter-firm behavior in these concentrated 
markets varies, with intense competition in some products and services, but corespective 
behavior in others. For example, there is fierce competition among investment banks for 
brokerage business narrowly defined – the buying and selling of financial assets.4 
Charges for buying and selling securities were fixed at a high level by agreement among 
large investment banks in the US prior to 1974, but thereafter conditions became more 
competitive and profit margins declined secularly. When markets were ‘decimalized’ in 
2001, margins fell once again. By 2006 it was widely claimed that investment banks were 
breaking even or losing money on their narrowly defined brokerage business. In late 2006 
Bank of America offered free trading to any customer with at least $25,000 in deposits. 
“Some observers believe commissions could disappear entirely” (The Economist, “Low 
touch but no soft money,” October 21, 2006, p. 87). This does not imply banks will 
abandon the trading business. Their customers need this service, and frenetic bank traders 
must have the constant real-time information that massive in-house trading provides in 
order to generate profits. Other competitive markets include exchange traded derivatives.  
 
 Conversely, practitioners agree that large investment banks do not use price 
competition to raise market share in traditionally lucrative investment banking businesses 
like M&As and IPOs, where fee structures are well established. US investment banks 
face less intense competition than their European counterparts. The Financial Times 
reports that M&A activity in Europe exceeded that in the US for 2006, yet cumulative 
fees for M&A work were almost twice as high in the US. “Mysteriously, however, 
European fee rates remain lower than in the US… Despite the fragmentation of the 
European market, pricing pressures actually appear to be fiercer than in the US… In the 
US market, indigenous banks have held on to high fees, partly be fending off foreign 
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interlopers… Higher fee rates mean American deals remain more lucrative.” (Financial 
Times, “Land of the Fee,” December 21, 2006, p. 14).  
 
The fee structures of hedge and private equity funds also clearly reflect a lack of 
price competition. The general partners in private equity funds charge an annual 
management fee of one and one-half to two percent of assets under management and a 
share of the profits of the fund, which is usually about 20 percent, payable after a 
benchmark rate of return has been achieved. They also charge firms they own 
considerable ‘fees.’ In a Financial Times article written to defend the efficiency of 
private equity funds, a former president and CEO of Morgan Stanley notes that “private 
equity’s notoriously high “friction costs” that increase the spread between the rate of 
return on the funds assets and the return investors receive at 11 percent a year (“Private 
equity’s halcyon days are not yet threatened,” March 8, 2007, p. 11). According to Froud 
and Williams, there is “little evidence of any competition on fee levels,” a view that 
seems widely accepted (2007, p. 10).5 Such consistently high fees that earn fund general 
partners fabulous fortunes (that are taxed at the low capital gains rate) are simply not 
compatible with the assumption of intense competition. An identical argument can be 
made about lucrative fee structures in the hedge fund industry – also normally 2 % of 
assets and 20% of profits. The ability to sustain such non-competitive fee structures over 
long periods is especially impressive given the mediocre performance of many private 
equity funds over the past decade, a period in which the average of all funds achieved 
returns below the S&P 500 and the lower quartile lost 6% annually (Wall Street Journal, 
“Private equity: Hit or miss,” March 3-4, 2007, p. B14).  
 
It is also clear that the sustained existence of numerous shockingly high ‘fees’ to 
commercial bank customers reflects corespective behavior.  
 
 “Bounced-check and ATM fees are setting records. Consumers are paying higher 
service charges on interest-bearing accounts, Bankrate.com says. And banks that 
issue credit cards are increasing fees for late payments and over-the-limit charges 
to as much as $39 per violations. Make this mistake once or twice and your 
interest rate could hit 30%. ‘These are not things that are subject to price 
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competition,” says Greg McBride of Bankrate.com.’” (USA Today, “Rising bank 
fees hit customers,” October 4, 2005). 
 
 
This corespective fee structure is a crucial source of bank profit. Table 1 shows that 
service charges on deposit accounts is the largest single source of identified non-interest 
income for commercial banks, while Figure 11 shows that non-interest income generates 
more than half of bank revenue.  
 
 We find a similar situation on the asset side of the private equity business. Funds, 
have been accused of forming ‘clubs” in which members either agree to cooperate to 
share takeover bids and thereby reduce competitive pressure on price, or in which one 
firm bids alone, then allocates pieces of the deal to friendly competitors in portions 
agreed upon before the bid. This raises industry profit. The Financial Times’ Lex column 
asked the question: “Will G-men drag private equity into the public glare? The Wall 
Street Journal reported on Oct. 10 that the Justice Dept. is looking into potential 
anticompetitive behavior by top private equity funds…. Do players observe tacit 
agreements to avoid pushing up deal prices?” (Financial Times, “A shadow over buyout 
firms,” October 23, 2006, p. 32). Business Week included “collusion in chasing deals” as 
one of the main reasons for the success of private equity funds (“In the money,” January 
20, 2007, p. 18). The Financial Times notes “a growing frustration among boards and 
shareholders… that they are too often faced with a single bid from a multiple consortium 
of buy-out firms. As a result, there is little competition to drive up the offer price” 
(“Coles puts heat on club bids,” March 3-4, 2007, p. 12). As the size of the targets 
escalates (with the recent takeover bid for TXU priced at $45 billion), it is inevitable that 
super buy-outs will involve clubs that inhibit competitive bidding. Since some estimates 
put the combined buying power of private equity firms as high as $2 trillion, or 10% of 
the value of the entire US stock market, it would seem that the sky is the limit. Even now, 
such collaboration involves the strongest players. The Wall Street Journal reported on 
what they called a “Goldman, Morgan Stanley Tango”: 
 
 It might  not be on a par with Luke Skywalker joining Darth Vader to rule the 
universe, but two historic Wall Street firm are combining forces to crack a deal in 
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the energy sector. The investing arms of Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan 
Stanley are quietly collaborating on a massive private equity deal… that could top 
out at $15 billion… The collaboration of the two elite securities firms… is an 
unmistakable reminder of how private equity is changing life on Wall Street. 
Across the Street, banks are angling to become both competitor to and 
collaborator with buyout shops. (Wall Street Journal, “Believe it: A Goldman, 
Morgan Stanley Tango,” January 24, 2007)6
 
 High concentration ratios in major financial markets along with clear evidence of 
collusive behavior among the dominant firms in these markets help explain the high 
profits of this era. Given these facts, it is astounding that so little serious work has been 
done on the ‘industrial organization’ of modern financial markets. It would appear that a 
commitment to the assumption of financial market efficiency among mainstream 
financial economists has become an obstacle to our understanding of how these firms and 
markets actually operate in an era in which their relative size and their power to affect 
real-sector outcomes are greater than at any time since the age of the Money Trust. 
 
3. Profit rates have risen because risk has risen. 
 
 There is substantial evidence that many financial firms have achieved surprisingly 
high profit rates in the Golden Age of finance in part because they either want to or have 
been forced to accept much higher risk than before. It has always been true that taking 
higher risk leads to higher profit in the absence of an unexpected negative outcome of 
sufficient magnitude – what the literature refers to as a “tail event.”  Corporate bonds 
have always had a higher yield than government bonds, and ‘below investment grade’ or 
junk bonds have always carried a higher return than investment grade bonds. As long as 
the normal and below-normal default rates of recent years persist, they will remain more 
profitable investments than AAA bonds. I consider several dimensions of this hypothesis.  
 
New Banking Strategies Trade High Risk for High Profit 
 
 The high profits in commercial and investment banking in the Golden Age have 
been due not only to corespective behavior and demand growth, but also to high-risk 
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strategies adopted primarily by the giant banks that dominate these markets.  The returns 
from most of these strategies appear as ‘noninterest income’ on bank income statements. 
Figure 11 shows the rise in noninterest income relative to interest income for all FDIC 
insured commercial banks. Less than 10% of bank revenue in the early 1980s, noninterest 
income exceeded 50% by 2005. The larger the bank, the larger the noninterest interest 
income share. For example, Citigroup reported noninterest income equal to 52% of 
adjusted operating income in 2005, while JPMorgan Chase reported 64% of income in 
noninterest form. For Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase respectively, trading revenue was 
4.4% and 14.7% [1%] of adjusted operating income, investment banking fees and 
commissions were 15.9% and 10.7% [3.7%], net securitization income was 6% and 5.8% 
[0.2%], and venture capital revenues 1.3% and 3.6% [0.2%] in 2005 (Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors 2006). The number in brackets is the average percent for the 69 bank 
holding companies with more than $10 billion in 2005. Table 1 shows the total amount of 
noninterest income earned by commercial banks in 2001 as well its main components. 
Note that the five largest banks received a hugely disproportionate share. For example, 
they received 83% of the $12.5 billion in trading revenue and 64% of the $16 billion of 
securitization income that year. As noted, the top five banks received 34% of ‘service 
charges on deposit accounts,’ a category representing 17% of all non-interest income, the 
largest source of such income identified on the Table. All told, the top five banks gained 
41% of all noninterest income. Their profits are increasingly determined by the more 
volatile sectors of noninterest income.  
 Many financial economists predicted that the rise in noninterest income shares 
would lead to lower risk because they expected noninterest income to be less cyclically 
variable than interest income and because they expected added portfolio diversification 
benefits. If interest and noninterest income have zero or negative correlation, increased 
noninterest income shares could improve the risk-return tradeoff. “As noninterest income 
trended up during the 1990s, it was generally believed that shifting banks’ income away 
from intermediation-based activities… and toward fee based activities would reduce 
income volatility. …Moreover, it was conventionally believed that expansion into new 
fee-based products and services reduced earnings volatility via diversification effects” 
(DeYoung and Rice, p. 109.  
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  However, recent empirical studies suggest the neither assumption is true: 
noninterest income is very volatile and there is no diversification reward. Work by Kevin 
Stiroh of the New York Fed, perhaps the most influential researcher on risk-return 
relations in commercial banks, concludes: “At the aggregate level, volatility of bank 
revenue growth has indeed declined in the 1990s, but this reflects lower volatility within 
net interest income growth rather than diversification benefits from increased noninterest 
income. Noninterest income growth is much more volatile than net interest income 
growth, largely due to very volatile trading revenue, and the covariance between the two 
has risen…” His analysis of bank-level data comes to the same conclusion. The cross 
section correlation between net interest and noninterest income growth is positive and 
increasing – from .32 in 1979 to .66 in 2000. As a result, indices of risk-adjusted profit 
rates (Sharpe ratios and Z-scores) declined monotonically across banks as their share of 
noninterest income increased. “Taken together, these results imply that the move toward 
noninterest income is actually worsening the risk/return tradeoff…” (2004, p. 855).  
 
 Two economists at the Chicago Fed used a different econometric procedure to 
investigate questions similar to those of Stiroh. They concluded that “marginal increases 
in noninterest income have been associated with higher profits, more variable profits, and 
on net, a worsening of the risk-return tradeoff for the average commercial bank during 
our sample period [from 1981 to 2001].” Moreover, “these findings are consistent with 
the recent literature that finds that noninterest income is more volatile than generally 
thought…” (DeYoung and Rice 2004, p. 122). They also find that risk rose substantially 
between the first and second half of the period, as dependence on noninterest income and 
on the risky strategies used to earn it accelerated: “our results suggest that the expansion 
in noninterest income improved the risk-return tradeoff at the average bank during the 
first part of our sample period, but worsened the risk-return tradeoff during recent years” 
(DeYoung and Rice 2004, p. 126). These results are quite robust to alternative 
specifications.  
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The last conclusion is important. Figure 1 shows that from 1993-1998, 
commercial banks had a very high ROA with little volatility. But while average ROA and 
ROE rose somewhat after 1998, volatility increased even more, causing risk-adjusted 
return to deteriorate. Again, large banks’ returns are the most volatile. As shown in Table 
2, the coefficients of variation of both ROA and ROE for the three giant commercial 
banks are much higher than the corresponding figures for all banks for the entire 1993-
2004 period. Keep in mind that a substantial part of bank risk is contained in their 
derivative holdings that are located off-balance-sheet. The risk we see may be just the tip 
of the iceberg. The fact that banks have lent very large amounts of money to hedge funds 
and private equity funds itself should raise concerns about risk.  
 
 Many analysts believed that the combination of securitization, which enables 
banks to sell risky assets they originate, and low-cost hedging through the purchase of 
insurance against default in the credit derivatives market would allow banks to raise 
profitability without raising risk. I consider securitization first. Fees from securitizing 
mortgages and other financial assets and from servicing these securitized pools have 
become much more important to the giant banks in the past two decades. The FDIC 
reports that in 2006 commercial banks had $20 billion in net securitization income, which 
was 11.9% of all noninterest income. Big banks get almost all of it. Fewer than 1% of 
banks reported any such income at all.  The fact that many mortgage-backed securities 
are guaranteed by quasi-governmental agencies accelerated the growth of the market. In 
1996, there were $770 billion of asset backed securities of all kinds, 37% of which were 
mortgage-backed. By 2005 the total had reached $3 trillion, 71% of which were 
mortgage-backed. Banks thus have an incentive to maximize the flow of mortgages (and 
other ‘plain vanilla’ products) into securitization because fee income is substantial and 
the loans are moved off balance sheet, so return on income and on equity rise with the 
volume of securitized loans.   
 
 Second, banks can buy insurance against loan loss from insurance companies, 
pension funds, hedge funds and other large banks in the credit derivative market. Thus, 
they can simultaneously make a large corporate loan and buy insurance that covers all or 
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part of their loss should the loan default. The growth of securitization and the emergence 
of credit derivatives have led many commentators to conclude that the banking system 
has become less risky in recent years. In 2004, Alan Greenspan concluded that credit 
derivatives and other complex financial instruments led “to the development of a far 
more flexible, efficient, and hence resilient financial system than existed just a quarter-
century ago” (Greenspan 2004)  
 
 However, there are reasons to be suspicious of this conclusion. First, there is a 
lemon’s problem with securitized loan sales. Securitized loan pools can be sold directly, 
or claims to cash flows from the pool can be sold. If the bank sells all the loans in the 
pool, prospective buyers might be suspicious that the bank had no incentive to screen out 
very risky loans and no incentive to monitor risk after they have been sold. To assure 
investors that the loans have been screened, banks usually keep the most risky loans 
themselves. Cash flows from the pool are usually sold in ‘tranches’ with different risk 
characteristics. To assuage investor concern about excessive risk, banks usually keep the 
most risky tranche or first-loss position, the one often referred to as “toxic waste.” So 
while banks sell lots of loans, the loans and tranches they hold are extremely risky.  The 
IMF’s Raghuram Rajan puts it this way:  
 
 Banks cannot sell all risks. They often have to bear the most complicated and 
volatile portion of the risks they originate, so even though some risk has been 
moved off bank balance sheets, balance sheets have been loaded with fresh, more 
complicated risks. In fact, the data suggest that despite a deepening of financial 
markets, banks may not be any safer than in the past. Moreover, the risk they now 
bear is a small (though perhaps the most volatile) tip of an iceberg of risk they 
have created. (2005, p. 3) 
 
In a similar vein, the Financial Times observed that securitization “does not mean the 
bank has shed all its risk. Usually a lender remains liable for any initial wave of losses 
(say, for the first 10 percent decline in a mortgage values)” (Financial Times, “A tale of 
low rates and high technology,” January 15, 2007, p. 9). Thus, the greater the flow of 
mortgages through the bank and into asset backed securities, the larger the buildup of 
risky holdings on and off balance sheets.7  
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 Second, very few banks actually use credit derivatives, so they can’t be the 
universal panacea they are made out to be. There is surprisingly little information 
available on this important matter. The most thorough study of bank use of credit 
derivatives to date is by Minton, Stulz and Williamson 2006. They report that in 2003, 
only 19 of the 345 large bank holding companies they studied used any credit derivatives. 
“The use of credit derivatives is limited by the lack of liquidity of the credit derivatives 
market for the credits that banks would most like to hedge” (2006, p. 21). Liquid credit 
derivative markets exist, but only for the loans of the largest corporations, and this is a 
market in which only giant banks can compete. Even so, the net notional amount of credit 
protection held by the 17 banks that were net buyers of insurance only amounted to 
1.83% of all bank loans and 3.6% of the loans of these 17 banks (2006, p. 3). But the 
credit derivative market is more highly concentrated than this fact alone would suggest. 
Only JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup and Bank of America were major users of credit 
derivatives in 2003, three other banks were moderate users, while the remaining 13 held 
small amounts.  The total notional amount of credit derivatives bought and sold by 
JPMorgan Chase in 2003, at $578 billion, exceeded the value for all other large bank 
holding companies combined! JPMorgan Chase’s net purchase of insurance was $26 
billion, while Citigroup was a net seller of $17 billion of insurance.  
 
 The authors’ analysis of the data leads them to conclude that “the typical position 
in credit derivative is taken for dealer activities rather than for hedging credit exposure 
from loans” (2006, p. 21) This may suggest that giant banks primarily use credit 
derivatives for trading on behalf of others and gambling with their own capital to create 
profitable risk – not reduce or hedge risk at the cost of lost potential profit. Another 
conclusion of the paper is that credit derivatives make it possible for big banks to do the 
most business possible on their capital base – in effect maximizing leverage. They thus 
“do not increase the soundness of banks as much as their purchases of credit derivatives 
would imply” (2006, p. 22). It thus appears that securitization and derivative creation and 
trading have raised big-bank profits, but simultaneously raised big-bank risk. Table 2 
shows that the largest banks have lower risk-adjusted profitability than the average bank. 
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It would appear that the claim by Greenspan and others that they have made banks safer 
and more efficient is based on hope rather than hard facts. 
 
 Figure 12 shows that investment bank profit rates have always been much more 
volatile than those of commercial banks. Investment banking is “a sector distinguished by 
revenues which seem to collapse with some regularity every three of four years” (Davis 
2003, p. 1). The main source of investment bank income has recently shifted from 
traditional activities such as advising on M&As and bringing IPOs to market –a volatile 
business, to trading assets for customers and on their own account – an even more 
volatile business. This change has taken place in spite of the fact that revenues from 
traditional activity have been high because of the recent boom in the global M&A 
market. The larger the investment bank, the more pronounced the strategy shift driving 
this change. The proportion of trading income generated by trading stocks, bonds, 
commodities and derivatives with the firm’s own capital has risen substantially. Davis 
notes that “Investment banks – at least in the US – are increasingly relying on proprietary 
trading – essentially risking the firm’s own capital – to sustain revenue. … The good old 
days when an investment bank made most or all of its profits from providing advice or 
executing transactions as agents are long past” (Davis 2003, p. 82). The potential risk 
involved in this part of the business is enormous, and is heightened by the growing 
importance of in-house hedge and private equity funds. For example, Goldman Sachs 
Asset Management is reported to be the world’s largest hedge fund, with about $21 
billion in capital. Its private equity arm is one of the world’s biggest, involved in $51 
billion in private equity deals in 2006 (S&P 2006, pp. 13 and 14).  
 
 2006 was a gala year for M&As. Global M&As were worth $3.8 trillion in 2006, 
11% higher than in the super year of 2000. Goldman Sachs, the largest investment bank 
and the number one bank in the league tables that year, achieved record investment 
banking profits in 2006. Yet an astounding 70% of net income came from gambling with 
the firm’s own capital, an unprecedented dependence on this source of income (The 
Economist, “Streets ahead of the rest,” December 23, 2006, p. 111). When Davis 2003 
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expressed concern over the trend toward gambling with the firm’s capital, it contributed 
less than 30% of net income.  
 
 The spectacular gains associated with these high risk strategies triggered equally 
spectacular compensation gains for the top executives and rainmakers in the investment 
banking world. Unlike most commercial banks, whose compensation is a modest percent 
of net income, investment banking is a business dependent on teams of high-powered 
high-priced ‘rainmakers’ to generate profits. Compensation is normally 50% of net 
income in investment banking. The 2006 bonus pool at industry giant Goldman Sachs 
was $16 billion, divided very unequally among 26,500 employees for an average of 
$622,000 per worker. Indeed, though Goldman’s compensation expense exploded in 
2006, profits rose by so much that compensation as a percent of net revenue actually fell 
slightly. Meanwhile, the average employee bonus at Lehman Brothers was $334,000, at 
Bear Sterns $320,000, and at Morgan Stanley $265,000 (New York Times, “Goldman 
chairman gets a bonus of $53.4 million,” December 20, 2006).  
 
 The Center for Labor Market Studies at Northeastern University recently reported 
that the top-five Wall Street firms were expected to award $36 billion to $44 billion to 
their 173,000 employees in 2006. It also noted that the combined real earnings of the 93 
million production and nonsupervisory workers in the US rose by $15.4 billion from 
2000 to 2006, which “is less than half of the combined bonuses awarded by the five Wall 
Street firms for just one year” in 2006 (New York Times, “Working harder for the man,” 
Jan 8 2007). Top investment bankers got $20 million to $25 million in bonuses, while top 
traders took home as much as $50 million.8 Perhaps a third or more of these gigantic 
bonuses come in the form of stock and stock options rather than cash. Goldman’s CEO 
received almost half of his $53 million bonus in this form. This compensation structure 
provides key employees with powerful incentives to sustain the current rapid income 
growth through high-risk strategies. This will maximize current bonuses and, by raising 
the stock price, makes the shares and options they received in previous years more 
valuable.  
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 Of course, legitimate hedging activity to reduce risk does take place in giant 
banks. This is what allows them to adopt what would have been seen in earlier periods as 
foolishly risky strategies. But no bank wants to hedge all risk because the cost would 
normally eliminate the potential gain that induced the bank to make the risky investment 
in the first place. Cost is not the only problem. Hedging strategies by banks often involve 
sophisticated, complex, dynamic derivative trading strategies. This form of hedging relies 
on the existence of liquid continuous markets with low to moderate transactions costs. A 
typical dynamic hedge involves shorting the risky asset held and investing in a risk-free 
asset.9 The hedge adjusts whenever the asset price or interest rate or volatility changes in 
the market, which they do continuously. Every time the asset price declines or volatility 
increases, the risky asset must be sold; this is what makes the hedge ‘dynamic.’ When 
problems hit an asset market, price falls and volatility rises. Banks with dynamic hedges 
must sell their risky assets, which accelerates the rate of price decrease, which in turn 
forces more hedged-asset sales. If many investors have made similar dynamic hedges and 
are selling, liquidity dries up and prices can free-fall. In ‘normal’ times, dynamic hedging 
can lower risk, but under conditions of market stress, it can prove dangerous for large 
banks and therefore for the entire banking system. Automated dynamic hedging systems 
are especially dangerous, as the fiasco with automated ‘portfolio insurance’ schemes 
demonstrated in the stock market crash of 1987. 
 
 Rajan notes that: 
 As originators of credit risk, banks hold first loss positions. A downturn in the 
economy… would result in actual losses being borne by bank balance sheets. Of 
course, banks hedge some positions through dynamic options-like strategies. As 
liquidity falls and [asset] prices move more, they will have to make larger and 
larger trades to offset those initial losses, thus demanding liquidity from the 
market precisely when it has little to offer. Losses could widen.”  (2005, p. 26) 
 
 It is now virtually impossible to make a reliable estimate of the degree of risk 
undertaken by large banks. As Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European Central 
Bank commented recently: “There is now such creativity of new and very sophisticated 
financial instruments that we don’t know where the risks are located” (Financial Times, 
‘Derivatives boom has created instability, says ECB president,” January 29, 2007). It 
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does seem clear that standard estimates of risk are excessively optimistic. Today’s giant 
banks are extremely complex, opaque institutions operating in ever-changing global 
markets, as well as in derivative markets that exist in cyberspace. National regulatory 
agencies have concluded that they cannot control these institutions in traditional ways, by 
inspecting their financial statements and placing restrictions on their balance sheets. Most 
of their risky positions are off-balance-sheet, risk estimates are out of date shortly after 
they are made because derivative positions change daily, and it would be almost 
impossible to accurately estimate firm risk even if all derivative contracts were 
accessible.  
 
Regulators thus “began allowing financial institutions to use their own version of 
[statistical] models to assess whether they were complying with rules that required them 
to reserve a sufficient cushion of capital based on the risks they took” (Partnoy 2003, p. 
265). Giant banks now essentially regulate themselves through sophisticated statistical 
models, the most popular of which is VAR (value at risk). “Widespread agreement has 
been reached on the measurement of market risk through so-called VAR (value at risk) 
models” (Davis 2003, p. 82). VAR is an estimate of the highest possible loss in the value 
of a portfolio of financial assets and liabilities over a fixed time interval with a specific 
statistical level of confidence. The Basle Committee’s 1996 Accord set large banks’ 
capital requirements in relation to its estimated VAR.  
 
 There are two important shortcomings of this approach to risk assessment: it fails 
to take appropriate account of highly unlikely severe negative shocks to the financial 
system; and it’s assessment of asset price correlations based on historical data does not 
capture the actual correlations observed in financial crises. First, the models normally do 
not ask what might happen to the bank if an extremely unlikely negative event were to 
take place. VAR models thus “cannot deal with what concerns users most, namely the 
rare occurrence of major market disturbances. As some risk managers have pointed out, 
the assumption of normal distribution of returns (no “fat tails”) implies that events such 
as the stock market crash of 1987, the EMS debacle of 1992, or the Asian, Russian and 
Brazilian crises are not apprehended by such models” (Steinherr 2000, p. 114). Consider 
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the February 27, 2007 market ‘scare’ that caused financial asset prices around the world 
to drop sharply. This caused the VIX (a measure of stock market volatility) to rise by 8 
standard deviations from its average. “If conventional models are correct, such an event 
should not have happened in the history of the known universe” (The Economist, “Grey 
Tuesday,” March 3, 2007, p. 78).  
 
Second, VAR estimates the risk attached to the firm’s entire portfolio of assets 
and liabilities. Thus, the asset-price correlation matrix is a key determinant of measured 
VAR. The lower the correlation among asset and liability prices, the lower the portfolio’s 
risk. Most VAR models assume that asset prices are jointly normally distributed and that 
future asset price correlations will be identical to those of the relevant past. Such 
correlations change over time. For example, in the past few years, asset prices have 
become more positively correlated than before for two reasons. First, asset managers 
have adopted similar strategies in search of high returns, so ever more money poured into 
the same risky assets. The fact that diversified portfolios were considered safe probably 
made investors feel justified in pursuing riskier assets, which raised the correlation of 
their price movements. Second, the universal quest for low correlations may have 
destroyed them. “By deliberately investing in assets that have shown little correlation in 
the past, investors may be making these assets more correlated” (Wall Street Journal, 
“Bets for safely only left many at greater risk,” March 1, 2007, p. C1).  
 
Moreover, we know that in crises, the historical correlation matrix loses all 
relation to actual asset price dynamics. In ‘scares’ and in crises most prices fall together 
as all investors run for liquidity and safety, creating a positive correlation unaccounted 
for in VAR calculations. An editorial in the Financial Times on the February 27, 2007 
global asset price drop made the following observation. “The price of almost every risky 
asset fell everywhere in the world.” It continued: “It is a reminder that, in a correction, 
and especially in a crisis, apparently unrelated assets suddenly start to do similar things: 
portfolios that look diversified may not be” (“A timely reminder about market risk,” 
March 3-4, 2007, p. 6). Partnoy summed the problem up as follows.  
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 VAR was dangerous. It gave firms a false sense of complacency, because it 
ignored certain risks and relied heavily on past price movements. In some 
markets, VAR actually increased risk, because every trader assessed risk in the 
same flawed way. In other markets, traders calculated VAR measures that varied 
‘by 14 times or more.’ … LTMC’s VAR models had predicted that the fund’s 
maximum daily loss would be in the tens of millions of dollars, and that it would 
not have collapsed in the lifetime of several billion universes. (2003, p. 263)  
 
 VAR models create an irresolvable problem for their users. If the model uses 
many years of past data to construct the price correlation matrix, the extraordinary pace 
of recent structural change will immediately render it obsolete. But if the model uses data 
only from the past year or so – as most do, the accuracy of the price correlation matrix 
will depend heavily on whatever special circumstances exist at present and thus not be 
generally representative of financial market dynamics.10 I have stressed the problem 
caused by the spike in positive correlations in a crisis. However, if the past year was 
profitable and serene, as in 2006, then a VAR assessment using only one year’s data will 
also grossly underestimate the likelihood of a serious crisis and thus stimulate excessive 
risk taking. There is no solution to this problem.   
 
 
New York Fed President Timothy Geithner expressed concern about these models. 
 
 The foundation of modern risk measurement rests on a framework that uses past 
returns to measure or estimate the distribution of future risk. The stability of the 
recent past, even if much of it proves durable, probably understates potential risk. 
The parameters used to estimate value at risk can produce large differences in 
predicted exposures, especially at extreme confidence intervals. Estimating the 
potential interactions among these exposures in conditions of stress is even 
harder, due to the uncertainty about the behavior of investors and other market 
participants and because of the potential effects of financial stress on overall 
economic activity (2006).  
 
We thus appear to be in a situation in which neither the big banks nor those who are 
obligated to regulate them can reliably estimate how risky they have become in their 
pursuit of high profits. But there is evidence that the risk indices commonly used 
seriously underestimate the true risk created by their new strategies. 
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  In sum, current bank strategies have raised profitability but probably at the cost of 
greater individual as well as systemic risk. Value-at-risk “a standard measure of potential 
losses on a bad trading day – has risen steadily” (The Economist, “Streets ahead of the 
rest,” December 23, 2006, p. 111). Moreover, the stock market has been signaling 
concern over rising risk in financial firms for years. Bank price-earnings ratios tend to be 
lower than those of nonfinancial corporations because their earnings have historically 
been more volatile. However, the trend of the price-earnings ratio of banks in the S&P 
500 index as a percent of this ratio for the whole index has been falling since the early 
1980s. Starting the period at over 80%, it was below 60% in 2005 in spite of record 
profits and relative low profit volatility at that time (Rajan 2005, p. 14).  Should we 
assume financial markets are ‘efficiently’ forecasting future financial storms? 
 
Institutional Investor Compensation Incentives Induce Risk Taking 
 
 Non-bank institutional investors have grown in importance in recent decades. 
Mutual funds had 2% of financial sector assets in 1974, but 18% in 2004. Pension funds 
held 14% of these assets in 1974 and 21% a decade later. (They dropped back to 18% in 
2004.) Hedge and private equity funds have grown in importance in recent years. 
Compensation for those who run institutional investment companies rises with assets 
under management, and is positively related to the excess of fund returns over some 
yardstick (such as the S&P 500 stock price index or a risk-free interest rate). This 
encourages firms to seek both maximum growth and maximum yield. Incentives for 
hedge and private equity firm executives create even stronger incentives for risk-taking. 
Since high returns both directly raise compensation and help increase the size of assets 
under management, there are strong reasons to pursue them. This is especially the case in 
periods in which financial asset prices have been rising for some time, because the longer 
the boom, the more likely that investors will believe that high-returns chasing is not a 
risky strategy. Empirical evidence shows that institutional investors suffer smaller 
percentage losses in their client base in years in which they achieve below average 
returns than the percentage gains they earn in years with above average returns – inflows 
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are convex in returns (Rajan 2005, p 18). This clearly motivates higher risk taking. In 
addition, there is an incentive to take risks that are not easily observable to clients – such 
as in derivatives markets. Hidden risk raises income but not assets, thus increasing return 
on assets and equity.   
 
  Consider the behavior of pension funds and insurance companies. In recent years 
they have become prime players in the credit derivatives market, where they provide 
insurance against loan default to other agents. This market experienced explosive growth 
since the early 1990s. In recent years the incidence of default has been low, so insurers 
have received a constant flow of premium payments. These constitute an addition to 
revenue and profit flows, but do not increase balance sheet assets or perceived risk. Thus, 
it is quite tempting for these firms to load up on these risky assets - as long as an 
unexpected outbreak of defaults does not occur. Or consider hedge funds. They adopt 
aggressive trading strategies that can be relied on to produce large positive returns most 
of the time, and they get one and one-half to two percent of the fund’s assets and often 
receive 20% of the returns. The downside is that risky strategies lead to disasters from 
time to time. This is a very asymmetric reward structure because they do not have to pay 
back upside compensation in the event of losses. “They are encouraged to [take high risk] 
by a fee structure that does not require the fund managers to pay back their earlier profit 
share to investors if an extreme event strikes and wipes out the fund” (Financial Times, 
“After the flood: how central banks fret about failures once liquidity dries up,” January 
30, 2007, p. 13).   
 
 Many institutional investors must achieve a high return on assets: if this cannot 
be done with safe assets, they must move to high-risk assets  
 
 Many individual and institutional investors believe they must attain a return on 
assets high enough to avoid serious financial problems. In the US, fewer than 50% of 
full-time private workers have a pension of any kind, defined contribution plans now  
outnumber traditional defined benefit plans, and most workers have relatively small 
savings in their plans. Thus, many households believe they have to achieve a relatively 
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high return on their modest assets to attain the minimum income needed to sustain an 
acceptable retirement life style. The same is true for many pension plans. They face rising 
payout demands as society moves from a preponderance of young savers to a rising 
percent of older dis-savers. Required payouts are actuarially determined. If their assets 
are insufficient to achieve the necessary income flows at lower-return safe investments, 
pension funds must increase risk to earn higher returns. This is widely recognized in the 
financial press. “American pension funds have analysed their liabilities. They need more 
than 6% to make up the shortfalls in their funds. .. They have to roll the dice to get it” 
(The Economist, “Alpha betting” September 16, 2006, p 84). “The collapse in returns is 
prompting more mainstream investors to enter the derivatives world for the first time. 
While many pension funds have traditionally been nervous of using these instruments, 
they are being pushed into their use from their clients and competitors.” (Financial 
Times, “New products grab the imagination”, January 18, 2007, p.11)  
 
 Insurance companies face similar problems, especially in periods of low interest 
rates following periods of high interest rates. Life insurance policies and annuities sold in 
a high interest era become less profitable if the returns the companies receive on their 
assets decline substantially over the life of the policy. Insurance companies are thus 
pressured to seek higher returns even at the cost of higher risk. This is one factor that has 
motivated them to invest rising shares of their assets in hedge funds and private equity 
funds: such “investors may be willing to gamble, despite the higher fees [in hedge funds] 
because they desperately need high return” (The Economist, “Alpha betting” September 
16, 2006, p 84).  
 
 Institutional investing is a structurally conducive to herd behavior. Contracts to 
manage large portfolios can be lost by a firm if its returns fall below the industry average 
for as little as six months. When asset bubbles take hold, institutional investors have a 
strong incentive to follow others in pursuit of capital gains even at the risk of absorbing 
losses when the bubble bursts. If many companies are making high returns by investing 
in bubble-driven assets with very high short-term capital gains, then even managers who 
are convinced the bubble will deflate in the near future must follow the herd. If they 
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don’t, they will show sub-par returns and lose business. If they follow the herd and the 
bubble bursts, all firms will suffer losses, so no firm will lose its competitive advantage.  
In their drive to meet or exceed average industry returns, a growing number of mutual 
funds are investing serious money in private equity and hedge funds. If these investments 
continue to pay high returns, other companies will be forced by competition to follow. 
“Most mutual funds limit their holdings to widely traded stocks and bonds. But as private 
financiers – from hedge funds to buyout firms – increasingly reshape the world of 
corporate finance, more mutual fund managers are getting in on the action. These 
managers say they are willing to take on the greater risks of private equity, including the 
difficulty of unloading them in a pinch, because of the higher returns” (Wall Street 
Journal, “Mutual funds delve into private equity,” August 2, 2006).   
 
 Consider, for example, the ‘junk’ or ‘high-yield’ corporate bond market. The rush 
into risky but high-return investments has driven the spread between Treasury bond and 
junk bond yields, which exceeded 8% in 2002, to 3% or less after 2003. One reason a low 
spread has been maintained is that the default rate on such bonds, which was 16% in 
2002, fell back to its historic average 5% in 2003 and was 1.5%, 3.1% and a record low 
0.8% in 2004-2006 respectively. The low spread suggests that markets have built a 
projection of continued low default rates into the pricing of these bonds –a precarious 
situation. One reason for low default rates is that even the lowest rated firms - whose 
median (profit - capital expenditures)/(interest expense) ratio was well below 1.0 in 2006 
– have been able, a la Ponzi, to borrow money to avoid default. As a report by Fitch 
Ratings put it: “The insatiable demand for yield product among traditional and 
nontraditional investors clearly helped these [junk bond] issuers to get access to external 
capital with unprecedented ease in 2006 and that enabled them to avoid default” (Fitch 
Ratings 2007, p. 7).11 The report concludes that “the very low default rate experienced in 
2006 is unsustainable…” (p. 10). 
 
Under current conditions, the riskier the bonds, the more desirable they are to 
investors.  
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 You have an incredible amount of liquidity sloshing around the [bond] market…. 
Much of that money is seeking higher returns, and is thus willing to pay higher 
risks. That willingness to buy has meant that borrowers with dubious credit end 
up paying relatively little for their money. … (New York Times, “Are high credit 
ratings just a thing of the past?” November 11, 2006)  
 
But if the market senses that falling profits and/or rising interest rates will again push 
default rates above average, we will see a rush to exit the junk bond market and a big 
spike in the spread.  
 
The hunt for high returns by investors in turn drives investment banks to create 
ever more complex derivative products, with the greater leverage and higher risk that lead 
to higher returns. This raises bank profits and creates a kind of vicious circle. As long as 
the process sustain itself, the profits of the financial firms that sell the risky assets, hold 
them on their own account, and/or trade in these markets can continue to grow. In the 
present period of low interest rates, high profits and modest average stock price gains in 
the developed world, large sums of money continue to flow into risky assets such as junk 
bonds, developing country stock markets, and complex derivative products (with limited 
liquidity) in search of high yields. The result of this flight-to-risk is an ongoing decline in 
the risk premiums paid on this class of investments. Declining returns on risky 
investments only make the problem worse, forcing agents to seek yet riskier assets.12  
 
 Reinforcing this dynamic, volatility indices such as VIX have fallen to near 
historic lows, suggesting that market opinion considers these assets to be safe, and thus 
relatively cheap to partially hedge. (VIX did jump sharply in the February 27, 2007 
market ‘scare.’) 
 
 A sharp decline in the implied volatility of global equity markets is encouraging a 
renewed shift into risky assets as hedge funds and other investors look for higher 
returns. Market volatility as measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
volatility index (Vix), Wall Street’s ‘fear index’ was trading just below 12 [a near 
record low] yesterday… Lower volatility ‘favours carry trades and shifts demand 
towards riskier assets’ JPMorgan Chase said in a note to clients yesterday. One 
sign of this heightened risk appetite is a fall in the cost of insuring risky 
companies against default, via the derivatives market.  (Financial Times, 
“Volatility dip sharpens appetite for risk,” September 19, 2006, p. 28).  
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 This would seem to be a situation with a limited life expectancy.  
 
4. Giant banks have become innovation machines that can protect high profit 
margins on most derivative products.  
 
 The business of creating and trading derivatives, dominated by a small number of 
banks, has become a core profit bank center. The FDIC reports that in late 2006, the 
seven largest commercial banks held 98% of the industry’s derivatives. As noted above, 
in 2005 trading revenues were 7.85% of Citigroup’s and 14.7% of JPMorgan Chase’ 
adjusted operating income. Trading assets were 19.8% of Citigroup’s total assets and 
26% of JPMorgan Chases’, but just 1.5% for all large bank holding companies. These 
numbers are staggering because both firms have assets of over a trillion dollars. 
JPMorgan Chase held about $350 billion in trading assets in late 2006. The notional 
value of Citigroup’s 2005 derivative contracts was 1,476% of total assets (compared to 
823% in 2001) while it was 4,426% for JPMorgan Chase. The average share for all bank 
holding companies with over $10 billion was only 74% (Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors 2006).  
 
 Derivative creation and trading can only be done profitably by banks with very 
large investments in the technologies and human capital required to be competitive in this 
business, and the trades are so large and so risky that only a bank with massive equity 
capital can afford to take the inevitable large losses associated with holding huge 
positions in exceptionally volatile assets. It is clear that since the derivative trading 
market is highly concentrated, market power might enable the core firms to sustain high 
profit margins on these trades.  However, collusion may not be the most important source 
of high profit in this business. 
 
 For some time after a new derivative product is introduced, it has a niche market 
with high profit margins. However, many such products eventually become standardized 
and can be sold by any large bank. These ‘commoditized’ or ‘plain vanilla’ products end 
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up being exchange traded, with transparent bid and asked prices available in real time on 
the Bloomberg website. Exchange traded derivatives are sold in a highly competitive 
market, with low profit margins. However, since banks are always creating new products 
with temporary niche markets and high margins, their extra profits are never completely 
competed away. Thus, the initial challenge to banks was to invent derivative products 
that were sufficiently complex to resist commoditization for long periods, and the 
ultimate challenge was to make them so complex that they could not be sold on 
exchanges at all. These challenges have been met. An increasing portion of derivative 
products are now exotic, extremely complex, and often created for a small number of 
customers. As such, they cannot be commoditized and must be sold over-the-counter 
(OTC) in non-transparent private deals negotiated between the bank and interested 
customers – “off Bloomberg” as one market observer put it.13  
 
 Such deals are characterized by very asymmetric information and bargaining 
power. OTC products suffer from “lack of transparency, of liquidity and of competitive 
pricing” (Steinherr 2000, p. 151). This allows banks to sell them even to users who do not 
understand them and would not buy them if they did understand them. The history of the 
Golden Age is replete with examples of major losses taken by OTC buyers who simply 
did not comprehend the true nature of their purchase. Orange County California and 
Gibson Greetings Inc. come to mind. In addition, the complexity and lack of competitive 
bidding allows banks to charge prices substantially above the ‘true’ value of the product 
at sale, and in the event that the derivative loses value and must be liquidated, the bank 
can buy it back for less than its fair value. It is thus primarily the OTC market that 
generates the high trading profits we see on the giant banks’ income statements. “The 
importance of derivatives as a profit source reflects both the banks’ creativity in product 
innovations and the wide spreads enjoyed on the complex… products” (Davis 2003, p. 
29). 
 
 As Figure 13 demonstrates, OTC derivatives have grown at an astounding pace. 
In 1992, the notional amount of global OTC derivatives was $25 trillion; in mid 1998, 
$72 trillion; by mid 2001 it was $98 trillion; in mid 2004 it was $258 trillion; and by mid 
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2006 it was $370 trillion. In 1996 there were about $180 billion in credit default swaps; 
in 2002 there were $2 trillion; in mid 2004 there were $6.4 trillion; by mid 2006 there 
was $20 trillion. In 2000, there were about $70 trillion in OTC interest rate derivatives; 
by mid 2006 this had grown to $262 trillion .14 The OTC derivative market is currently 
four times larger than exchange traded derivatives (Financial Times, “Pension funds help 
derivatives market surge to $370,000 bn” January 18, 2007, p. 11). Thus, banks earn high 
margins on the bulk of their derivative trades and the volume of OTC trades is exploding, 
causing a rapid rise in profit. This creates an incentive to increase the rate of innovation. 
A managing director at a large investment bank explained: “We are nomads, dependent 
on moving and innovating... What was innovative a few years ago is now being done by 
junior clerks for just a few basic points. You have to be like a shark – swimming all the 
time to stay alive” (Davis 2003, p. 20). This perpetual-motion derivative innovation 
machine may continue to generate high profits for large banks for some time, until 
unexpected shocks destroy the liquidity of the markets they trade in.  
 
 The fact that the big banks make a large and rapidly increasing portion of their 
profits creating and trading exotic derivative products is one reason for their participation 
in today’s Golden Age of finance. It also suggests that powerful incentives will continue 
to drive the ongoing explosion of derivative products. It is the continuous explosion in 
derivative products that in turn facilitates the rapid structural change we have seen in 
financial markets over the past decade. 
  
Moral Hazard, Systemic Risk and System Resilience  
 
Conditions in financial markets in recent years have been such that high profits 
have rained on almost everyone operating within them. Those adopting the riskiest 
strategies have been the most blessed. Analysts stress that ‘liquidity’ – a concept with no 
consensus definition – has been in excess supply for years. The cost of capital has thus 
been unusually low, while asset prices have been rising most of the time. Meanwhile, no 
significant negative ‘shocks’ have disturbed high-yield high-risk markets in the last few 
years. As 2006 ended, volatility indices were at or near historic lows. The President of the 
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New York Fed put it this way. “Long-term interest rates have remained relatively low in 
nominal and real terms. Equity and other asset prices have moved higher. Credit spreads 
have declined to quite low levels. Market participants report exceptionally high levels of 
liquidity. And volatility, both realized and expected, has remained low across many 
different types of financial assets, markets and economies” (Geithner 2006). In the US in 
the same period, corporate profit as a percent of national income rose to post-war highs. 
By the end of 2006, corporate profits had increased by double-digit percentages for 19 
consecutive quarters. Moreover, private equity fund takeover bids and pressures on 
nonfinancial corporations by hedge funds to increase stock buybacks have helped keep 
stock prices rising, fueling the boom. Business Week reports that hedge funds “helped 
compel 29 of the 30 members of the Dow Jones industrial average to repurchase shares in 
recent years,” and “that a record $600 billion in US shares were removed from the public 
market just in the first nine months of 2006” (“What the market is telling us,” March 12, 
2007, p. 37).  
 
 The conventional wisdom says that the widespread use of complex derivative 
products has made it possible to hedge almost any gamble. Meanwhile, the cost of 
hedging is lower than ever, a result of the prosperous and stable conditions of the recent 
past. It also says that the widespread diffusion of risk across markets and agents has 
greatly reduced systemic risk. Convinced that markets are now and will continue to be 
robust, agents seem to believe they can safely make what would have previously been 
considered very risky gambles, perhaps buying some risk protection in derivative markets 
that have adequate liquidity under normal conditions. If excessive risks have built up in 
sections of the market, they are hidden off-balance-sheet and/or do not have to be 
publicly reported, so we cannot see them. Lured by the prospects of high returns at little 
risk, by the widespread and accurate perception that millions of people are getting 
fabulously rich by making or managing financial investments, by the incentive structure 
and competitive pressures in the institutional investment business, or by the necessity to 
achieve higher returns than can be obtained on safe investments, individuals and financial 
firms have been making unusually risky investments. In other words, moral hazard 
permeates today’s financial markets. The belief that new structures and new financial 
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instruments have greatly reduced individual risk seems to have led to a substantial 
increase in actual systemic risk.  
 
 The fact that so many financial market ‘insiders’ have expressed serious concern 
about systemic risk is telling. New York Fed President Timothy Geithner recently gave a 
talk on the impact of hedge funds and derivatives on financial markets. After citing their 
potential for helping reduce individual risk and expressing his belief that markets were 
now less vulnerable to small and moderate shocks, he concluded that they may have 
increased the likelihood of a really severe systemic crisis. “The changes that have 
reduced the vulnerability of the system to smaller shocks may have increased the severity 
of the large ones.” Impressed by the size and speed of structural change in global 
financial markets, he urged practitioners and regulators to pay “more attention to 
assessing potential exposure in extreme events that lie outside [all] past experience, not 
just outside recent past experience.” He also noted that the complex new financial system 
made this task extremely difficult: “Understanding and evaluating ‘tail events’ – low 
probability, high severity instances of stress – is a principal, and extraordinarily difficult, 
aspect of risk management. These challenges have likely increased with the complexity 
of financial instruments, the opacity of some counterparties, the rapidity with which large 
positions can change, and the potential feedback effects associate with leveraged 
positions” (2006).15  
 
 Alfred Steinherr, General Manager of the European Investment Bank and author 
of an excellent book on derivates, offers a similarly nervous forecast.  
 
 In recent years, financial disturbances have on several occasions turned into full-
blown crises that became magnified in derivatives-connected domestic and 
international markets, and spread around the globe with more violence than had 
been imaginable before the 1990s. …The growth of derivative finance has 
contributed to the risk of crisis contagion in several ways. Foremost among these 
are the undefinable and unlocalisable nature of the OTC market, the derivative-
induced lack of transparency, the breakdown of hedging and valuation of 
derivative positions in the face of major breaks in asset prices, the growing 
concentration of the derivatives industry and the operational risks of the large 
players. (2000, pp. 183 and190) 
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Even Alan Greenspan, so badly burned by his ‘irrational exuberance’ comment in 1996 
that he became a perpetual cheerleader for the market, joined the chorus. “Risk is no 
longer perceived as major risk, at least as it was in years past, and that, I must say, I find 
disturbing” (Business Week, “How Alan helped Ben,” March 12, 2007, p. 40). 
 
 Individual and market risk, on the one hand, and systemic risk on the other, are 
co-dependent. Agents must make some assessment of systemic risk before selecting an 
investment strategy. Assets that are attractive at the moment may turn out to be losers if a 
crisis breaks out in somewhere in the system and spills over to other market segments, 
destroying liquidity in the markets it hits. Conversely, systemic risk is greatly affected by 
the decisions of agents; conservative investment strategies normally underpin financially 
robust financial systems. The aggressive investment strategies of the moment assume a 
robust, safe financial system. They may well continue to be successful - until a significant 
unexpected problem hits important financial markets. However, these high risk strategies 
make the outbreak of such a ‘tail event’ more likely.    
 
 Tail events will eventually take place and test the fragility of the new financial 
system. They always have. For example, the severe 1980s commercial banking crisis was 
triggered by events thought at the time to be almost impossible - until they happened. The 
tail event was the Latin American repayment crisis triggered by Mexico’s default on its 
sovereign debt in August 1982. In the absence of intervention by the Fed and FDIC, it is 
likely that most US money center banks, which had become technically insolvent because 
defaulted loans to Latin America were much larger than their equity, would have failed. 
Yet when these loans were being made, the unanimous opinion on Wall Street was that 
sovereign debt was as good as gold, a conclusion that seemed consistent with the facts at 
that time. Latin American sovereign debt defaults were virtually non existent in the 
1970s. However, by the end of the 1980s sovereign debt in default from this area was 
over $300 billion (The Economist “Sovereign debt in default” October 7, 2006, p.113). 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 and Russian bond defaults in 1998 could also be 
considered tail events.  
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  It took costly intervention by government and international financial institutions 
to prevent a global financial system meltdown in the aftermath of these tail events. 
Indeed, such interventions (along with rising market concentration and aggressive 
monetary policy at key points such as the early 1990s and 2001-05) help explain why 
financial firms have been able to profit from high-risk strategies for so long without 
suffering the full consequences of these risks. However, these interventions only 
reinforced the widespread belief that even a severe tail event would not be allowed to 
trigger a systemic crisis. Thus, they increased the moral hazard infecting financial 
markets. The IMF noted in September 2005 that “recent economic and market 
developments have reduced risks in the near term, but they are storing up potential 
vulnerabilities for the future.”16
   
 Who will absorb risk and create liquidity if a tail event takes place and a systemic 
crisis develops? Letting commercial banks absorb most risk - the traditional approach - is 
now seen as old fashioned. It is safer, mainstream analysts argue, to disperse risk widely 
around the system- even if we don’t know how much risk there is, or where it is, and are 
not sure if those who hold risk will be able to handle it in a crisis. In the quarter century 
following World War II, commercial banks dominated US financial markets, and their 
top managers received a relatively fixed salary. Since compensation was not packed with 
cash, stock and stock option bonuses as it is today, there was little incentive for banks to 
take high risks. The restrictions on competition contained in Glass-Steagall regulations 
put in place in the Depression made it easier for banks to sustain conservative strategies. 
It is hardly surprising that banks exhibited few signs of excessive risk-taking in the early 
post WWII years. There were virtually no commercial bank failures in the 1950s and 
1960s, and only a modest number of failures in the 1970s. Solid balance sheet positions 
allowed banks to be the liquidity supplier of next-to-last resort to nonfinancial and other 
financial firms during periods of stress, with the Fed and the FDIC committed to back 
them up when necessary.  
 
 36
 In recent decades, banks have lost substantial market share as financial asset 
holdings spread more widely across institutions. Commercial banks saw their share of 
financial sector assets fall from 45% in 1952 to 24% in 2005. And compensation 
structures in commercial banks have changed dramatically, leading to more aggressive 
and risky strategies. Moreover, the rise in large off-balance-sheet obligations and in 
banks’ use of complex dynamic hedging strategies make it harder to assess their ability to 
supply the liquidity needs of other financial institutions in the event of a serious crisis. 
But it does appear that this ability has declined, perhaps substantially. If a giant bank 
were to become insolvent, the economic spillover would be extremely dangerous.  
 
 The Financial Times’ respected analyst John Plender recently assessed systemic 
risk in today’s financial markets. He noted a virtual consensus among leading 
practitioners and central bankers that “another major shock is likely and that the potential 
damages could be greater” than those caused by previous shocks. New York Fed chair 
Geithner is said to be worried that banks, the traditional supplier of liquidity in financial 
crises, may themselves be too illiquid to perform this task. “Credit risk in the OTC 
derivatives market is large relative to more traditional forms of credit and is also quite 
large relative to the capital cushions and earnings of the major banks and investment 
banks.” Geithner noted that these risks are opaque because they do not appear on balance 
sheets. Risk is “harder to measure because investments in credit derivatives contain 
‘embedded leverage’ where one’s exposure to profit or loss is multiplied many times 
compared to the same investment in the underlying conventional security.” Plender 
concluded that the dangers of systemic risk are quite high and that most central bankers 
know this. Everyone is worried that if a serious crisis were to break out in today’s opaque 
and global financial market, it is likely that no central banker could bring all the key 
players into a room and organize a market rescue as was done with Long Term Capital 
Market in 1998. (Financial Times, “After the flood: how central banks fret about failures 
once liquidity dries up,” January 30, 2007, p. 13).17
 
 Harvard’s Kenneth Rogoff, a former chief economist of the IMF, also expressed 
concern about systemic risk. He noted that while many plans for improving the global 
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financial architecture were proposed and discussed awhile back: “Over the past couple of 
years all introspection appears to have vanished” as a firm belief that “macroeconomic 
stability at the national level combined with continuing financial innovation… have 
obviated any need to tinker with the system.”  In its place has found a smug assurance 
that “there is no problem that markets cannot solve.” To which he responded:  
 Really? How well would markets handle the fallout from a sharp slowdown in 
India or China? How would they react to a dirty nuclear bomb in a US city that 
triggered a retreat from US assets, and a sudden reluctance on the part of global 
investors to keep financing America’s 800-plus billion dollar current account 
deficit? 
 
After listing other possible global tail events, Rogoff went on to argue that central banks 
might not be able to rescue the financial system as they did so many times in the past: 
“contrary to market perceptions, global central banks have only very limited instruments 
for dealing with a genuinely sharp rise in global volatility, particularly one that is geo-
politically induced” (Financial Times, “No grand plans, but the financial system needs 
fixing,” February 8, 2007, p. 10). 
 
 I give the last word on assessing the state of systemic risk and the ability of 
financial markets to deal with a systemic crisis to Raghuram Rajan, the Director of 
Research of the International Monetary Fund. His view is as follows. Risk has indeed 
been made more diffuse today through complex derivative transactions, but the belief that 
hedging will reduce the dangers associated with objectively risky actions has, in effect, 
led agents to be more risk loving, and this has increased systemic risk.  
 
 Even though there are far more participants today able to absorb risk, the 
[systemic] financial risks that are being created are indeed greater. And even 
though there should theoretically be a diversity of opinion and actions by 
participants and a greater capacity to absorb the risks, competition [for yield] and 
compensation [incentives] may induce more correlation in behavior than 
desirable. … It is possible these developments may create more financial-sector-
induced procyclicality than the past. They may also create a greater (albeit still 
small) probability of a catastrophic meltdown. (2005, p. 3)  
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 Can we count on commercial banks to rescue the financial system from disaster in 
the event of a systemic crisis, as we have in the past? Rajan’s answer is surprisingly 
cautious.  
 
 One reason banks functioned effectively in 1998 as liquidity providers of next-to-
last resort was because they were not perceived as credit risks, so they attracted 
spare liquidity. This need not be the case in future crises. As originators of credit 
risk, banks hold first loss positions. A downturn in the economy, perhaps caused 
by, and causing asset price realignment, would result in asset losses being borne 
by bank balance sheets. Of course, banks hedge some positions through dynamic 
options-like strategies. As liquidity falls and prices move more, they will have to 
make larger and larger trades to offset those initial losses, thus demanding 
liquidity from the market precisely when it has little to offer. Bank losses could 
widen. (2005, p. 26)  
 
 To complete this nightmare scenario, Rajan suggests that if some banks face 
serious losses in a crisis and there is uncertainty about how these are distributed across 
banks, only a few “unimpeachable” banks will receive the liquidity fleeing all risky 
markets. The ‘safe’ banks may refuse to lend to more vulnerable banks, “the inter-bank 
loan market could freeze up, and one could well have a full blown financial crisis” (2005, 
p. 26).  
 
Conclusion 
 
 In the body of this paper I propose a number of possible explanations of Volcker’s 
Paradox. I do not know how important each has been to the creation and reproduction of 
the new Golden Age of finance, but together they probably have substantial explanatory 
power. It might be interesting to speculate about the likelihood that these factors will 
continue to sustain high financial sector profits and growth in the coming years. Of 
course, such prognostication is perilous. The structure of financial markets continues to 
undergo mutation at an unprecedented pace, and it is now so complex and opaque that I 
am not sure anyone fully understands it. This gives the asset price correlation matrix that 
is the foundation of risk assessment and hedging behavior a phantasmagorical quality. 
Moreover the standard models of financial market systems found in the mainstream 
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literature have no probative value because while they are equilibrium models, the 
structure of the global financial system is constantly evolving and thus is never in – and 
perhaps never near - equilibrium. Having stressed my lack of faith in predictions about 
future financial developments, I offer some here. 
 
 First, it is likely that financial markets will – in the absence of system-shaking 
crises – continue to grow, though not at the same speed as in the past. Second, 
concentration ratios seem likely to increase, though not at the amazing rate undergone in 
US commercial banking between the early 1990s and 2000. These two trends should 
continue to make it possible for corespective dimensions of competition to continue. 
Third, I argued that one important reason many financial firms have high profit rates is 
because incentive structures, competitive pressure and the need to achieve high yields to 
survive have induced high risk strategies that can, in normal times, increase profits. There 
are several reasons why it is hard to make the case that this situation will be sustained 
indefinitely. One is that the rush to traditionally high-risk high-return assets has reduced 
risk premiums substantially, so the extra return that can be purchased by accepting higher 
risk is smaller that it was a couple of years ago, and it now takes higher leverage to raise 
returns. If the incidence of defaults should substantially rise in some of these markets, the 
rush to get out could cause serious financial distress. Another is that a prudent person 
would not bet the ranch on the likelihood that global markets will continue to provide 
investors unlimited capital at low interest rates or that the profit share of income will 
remain so high. The ideal conditions of the last few years will certainly end soon. Yet 
another is that a serious tail event is out there somewhere waiting to announce its 
presence.  
 
 Fourth, as Figure 12 shows, investment bank profits have been very volatile, even 
in the Golden Age. When they are profitable they are very profitable, and when they are 
not, profits collapse. The rate of acceleration of derivatives markets and the profits 
investment banks have been making from them recently seem to defy the laws of physics 
if not finance. Can Goldman Sachs perpetually book record profits 70% of which are 
from trading on its own account? I am hesitant to suggest that this bonanza cannot 
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continue for some years to come, because derivatives markets have been growing rapidly 
for a long time now. M&A profits may hold up for a year of two, but it is highly unlikely 
they can permanently sustain the pace of the past few years. Moreover, by relying so 
heavily on gambling with their own money on very risky trading and on hedge and 
private equity funds, big investment banks have accepted unprecedented risk – as insiders 
often acknowledge in private conversations. Should serious problems develop in key 
segments of the derivatives market, investment banks might be in serious trouble. Finally, 
hedge and private equity fund profits, which have been very high, are vulnerable to any 
drying up of global liquidity or rise in interest rates or fall in nonfinancial corporate 
profits.  
 
 I conclude that troubles lie ahead for financial firms and markets, perhaps serious 
trouble in the short run. Catastrophic stress may break out in the intermediate run; if it 
does, we will see if monetary authorities are still capable of crisis containment. History 
insists that no financial boom is permanent. I am tempted to say that this Golden Age will 
end with a bang rather than a whimper. I find it hard to believe that financial markets can 
continue to grow forever at the rapid pace of the current era, or that giant firms piling up 
unprecedented if hidden risk will never suffer the consequences. No one knows what 
dangers are hidden off their balance sheets or in obscure footnotes in incomprehensible 
financial reports.18 I find it difficult to believe that financial profits will rise indefinitely 
relative to GDP or those of nonfinancial firms, or that the leaders of financial and 
nonfinancial firms can get away forever with enriching themselves while jobs and median 
wages stagnate and inequality soars. The odds probably are that the Golden Age will end 
with a whimper, but, as Rajan and others have been warning, it is possible it will go out 
with a bang.  But at some point not knowable today, it will end.  
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 
After-tax Return on Assets and Equity for Commercial Banks
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Source: FDIC. ROA series is on right axis, ROE series is on left axis. 
pe
rc
en
t
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0.
1 
pe
rc
en
t
ROE ROA
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Real Profits of the Financial Sector
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Figure 3 
Financial Sector Profits as a Percent of GDP
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Figure 4 
Financial Profits as a Percent of Nonfinancial Profits
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Figure 5 
Financial Assets Held by the Financial Sector
(as a Percent of GDP)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
19
52
19
55
19
58
19
61
19
64
19
67
19
70
19
73
19
76
19
79
19
82
19
85
19
88
19
91
19
94
19
97
20
00
20
03
Source: Flow of Funds Various Tables, NIPA Table 1.14
Pe
rc
en
t
 
 
 
Figure 6  
Gross Value Added of Financial Corporations as a Percent of 
Non-Financial Corporations
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Figure 7 
Total Credit Market Debt as a Percent of GDP
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Figure 8 
Total Financial Assets as a Percent of GDP
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Figure 9 
Ratio of Total Derivatives to Global GDP
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Figure 10 
Rise in Concentration in Commercial Banking 
Shares of the Largest Banks in Total Assets
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Figure 11 
The Ratio of Non-interest Income to Interest Income for 
Commercial Banks
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Figure 12 
Pre-Tax ROE for Commercial Banks and Investment Banks
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Figure 13 
Amounts Outstanding of OTC Derivatives
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TABLES 
 
Table 1:  
 
 
Top 5 Banks' Share Of Non-Interest Income Of Insured Commercial Banks In 2001 
 
 Non-interest income category  Share in Total Non-interest 
Income (%) 
Top 5 Banks' Share in the 
category (%) 
 
Traditional sources of non-interest income  
Net gains/losses on sales of other 
assets  
1.43 84.60 
Net gains/losses on loans sales  2.95 47.50 
Income from fiduciary (trust) activities 13.20 39.40 
Service charge on deposit accounts  16.84 33.90 
Trading, investment banking, and insurance  
Trading revenues  7.97 82.60 
Investment banking and other fees  5.79 55.80 
Venture capital revenue  -0.47 na 
Insurance commissions and fees  1.83 38.40 
Servicing and securitizing loans  
Servicing fees  7.36 41.50 
Securitization income  10.40 64.00 
Not identified  
Other non-interest income  32.66 
Source: Bank Call Reports (FDIC Research Information System) 
21.20 
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Table 2:  
 
 
Coefficient Of Variation For Commercial Bank ROA And ROE 
 
 
Top 3 Commercial Banks 
 
 
All Commercial Banks 
 
 
1984-1992 
 
 
1993-2003 
 
1980-1992 
 
1993-2004 
 
COV of ROA 
 
 
 
1.048 
 
0.168 
 
0.341 
 
0.089 
 
COV of ROE 
 
 
0.990 
 
0.191 
 
0.330 
 
0.067 
Sources: Compustat for individual bank data, FDIC for industry statistics  
Note:  Coefficient of variation is the standard deviation of the data series divided by its 
mean.  
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ENDNOTES 
 
                                                 
1 Dumenil and Levy 2004 are, to my knowledge, the only people who have attempted to do so.  
2 Figures 2, 3 and 4 are based on National Income and Product Market data from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. Following the latest Standard Industry Classification revisions, the definition of the financial 
sector changed in ways that make the data of the last few years inconsistent with earlier data. For example, 
the financial sector now includes non-bank holding companies.  
3 The history of this period demonstrates once again that it is not possible to have lightly regulated  
financial markets unless the state is willing to repeatedly step in and rescue the system from endogenously 
generated disasters and crises. Left only to themselves, unregulated financial markets cannot reproduce 
themselves over time.  
4 The ‘prime brokerage’ services that banks provide for institutional clients such as hedge funds are much 
broader that simple buying and selling and are a major source of bank profits. They include financing, 
securities lending, and technological and operational support. Their credit exposure to hedge funds includes 
margin loans, securities lending, reverse purchase agreements and derivatives counterparty risk. 
5 Smaller investors who invest in ‘funds of funds’ get charged an additional 1% of assets and 5% of profits 
on top of the huge fees charged by the private equity funds themselves. 
6 One should note in passing the irony implicit in the way the market understands the transition from the 
leveraged buyout boom of the 1980s to the private equity boom of the present era. The ‘narrative’ used to 
support the first boom was that the creation of large conglomerates led to massive inefficiencies that could 
be remedied by breaking up conglomerates into many free-standing  firms. The implicit narrative 
supporting the current boom is that private equity funds can create large collections of heterogeneous firms 
– large buyout funds are de facto conglomerates controlling dozens of individual firms - and manage them 
more efficiently than they were managed when they were free-standing.   
7 The mortgage business provides another example of how bank strategies have shifted, in this case from 
redlining to predatory lending. Banks used to refuse to sell mortgage loans in low income and minority 
neighborhoods. They now originate or buy very risky but high yield mortgages sold to low income families 
in poor neighborhoods. In 2005 in the heat of the housing bubble, many of these mortgages required no 
proof of ability to pay and let borrowers miss interest payments without penalty - missed payments were 
added onto principal. The default rate on these loans has risen substantially in the past year.  
8 Data from New York Times, “Goldman Chairman gets a bonus of S$53.4 million,” December 20, 2006. 
9 “Shorting” is the sale of an asset at an agreed price with delivery in the future. If the asset price falls 
between the sale and delivery dates, the short seller makes a profit.  
10 The same problem will result if longer term data are used, but the weights on recent observations are 
much larger than those on more distant observations.  
11 The Report notes that lower rated firms “are generally only able to service their significant debt burdens 
by tapping external funding and have no cushion to sustain them if business or borrowing conditions 
soften” (p. 7). 
12 The Wall Street Journal put it this way: “High rates of savings around the world combined with open 
global financial markets have created a flood of investment money seeking higher returns. That flood 
encourages risk taking and reduces the return on risky investments. The spread between high yield bonds 
and Treasury securities, for instance, has narrowed to 3.5%, down from a historic average of 5%, according 
to Moody’s Investors Service. The gap between bond yields in emerging markets and US markets has also 
decreased, down from 2.3% last year and 4% in 2004.” The article then poses the question: “when will fear 
return?” (WSJ, “Financial risk: where has it gone?” December 30-31, 2006, p. A9).  
13 I am indebted to Doug Cliggott for this insight. 
14 British Bankers’ Association, BBA Credit Derivative Report 2006. p. 5, Group of Ten 2001, p. 459, and 
Bank for International Settlements website. 
15An IMF econometric study of the impact of increased concentration and conglomeration in the US 
banking system on systemic risk came to similar conclusions. Controlling for an appropriate set of 
independent variables, the study concluded that increased concentration led to lower risk-adjusted 
profitability (as measured by a Z-index) and to higher systemic risk. These relations grew stronger over 
time (deNicolo, Bartholemew, Zaman and Zephirin, 2003, p. 25).  
16 Cited in the Financial Markets Center’s “Capital Flows Monitor,” April 27, 2006, p. 4. 
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17 An experienced financial market analyst made the following observation to me; “Never before have we 
seen so many regulators and central bankers swarming around their major financial institutions before an 
episode of financial instability has erupted. I infer from this that these guys are scared to death about 
something.”  
18 On the latter point, see the fascinating article by Malcolm Cauldwell on Enron in the New Yorker (“Open 
secrets: Enron, intelligence, and the peril of too much information,” January 8, 2006, pp. 44-53). To pick 
just one example Enron had 3000 Special Purpose Entities described in 3 million pages in their internal 
records. Summaries of these reports by a Duke Law School professor averaged 40 single space pages each.  
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